[The quid pro quo] "Balfour-WWI negotiations are referred to in various documents. For example, Samuel Landman, a leader of the Zionist-revisionists and secretary of the world Zionist organization, described them in a 1935 article in World Jewry: “After an understanding had been arrived at between Sir Mark Sykes and [Zionists] Weizmann a…
[The quid pro quo] "Balfour-WWI negotiations are referred to in various documents. For example, Samuel Landman, a leader of the Zionist-revisionists and secretary of the world Zionist organization, described them in a 1935 article in World Jewry: “After an understanding had been arrived at between Sir Mark Sykes and [Zionists] Weizmann and Sokolow, it was resolved to send a secret message to [Supreme Court] Justice Brandeis that the British Cabinet would help the Jews to gain Palestine in return for active Jewish sympathy and for support in the USA for the Allied cause, so as to bring about a radical pro-Ally tendency in the United States." British Colonial Secretary Lord Cavendish, in a memorandum to the British Cabinet in 1923, reminded his colleagues:
“The object [of the Balfour Declaration] was to enlist the sympathies on the Allied side of influential Jews and Jewish organizations all over the world... and it is arguable that the negotiations with the Zionists...did in fact have considerable effect in advancing the date at which the United States government intervened in the war.”[34]
[The quid pro quo] "Balfour-WWI negotiations are referred to in various documents. For example, Samuel Landman, a leader of the Zionist-revisionists and secretary of the world Zionist organization, described them in a 1935 article in World Jewry: “After an understanding had been arrived at between Sir Mark Sykes and [Zionists] Weizmann and Sokolow, it was resolved to send a secret message to [Supreme Court] Justice Brandeis that the British Cabinet would help the Jews to gain Palestine in return for active Jewish sympathy and for support in the USA for the Allied cause, so as to bring about a radical pro-Ally tendency in the United States." British Colonial Secretary Lord Cavendish, in a memorandum to the British Cabinet in 1923, reminded his colleagues:
“The object [of the Balfour Declaration] was to enlist the sympathies on the Allied side of influential Jews and Jewish organizations all over the world... and it is arguable that the negotiations with the Zionists...did in fact have considerable effect in advancing the date at which the United States government intervened in the war.”[34]
The bottom of this pit has yet to be found.